Equinox Gold · Deep Dive · DRAFT 35 · Updated August 22, 2026
Following the merger with Orla Mining, Equinox Gold is a North America-focused senior gold producer with six producing mines or operating complexes. Greenstone, Valentine and Musselwhite form the Canadian core; Camino Rojo, Nicaragua and Mesquite round out the current production portfolio.
At the same time, the next generation is already waiting: Valentine Phase 2, South Railroad, Castle Mountain, Los Filos and Camino Rojo Underground could together add more than 800,000 ounces of annual production. Before turning that into an investment thesis, we first want to understand what makes each mine economically distinct. We go deeper technically where processing, logistics, geology or infrastructure materially change the investment case.
Canada · USA · Mexico · Nicaragua
The 2025 merger with Calibre and the completion of the Orla acquisition on July 31, 2026 fundamentally reshaped Equinox in a short period. The company now owns six producing mines or operating complexes as well as one of the largest development pipelines among North America-focused gold producers.
Portfolio quality varies materially. Greenstone and Valentine are new large-scale Canadian operations that still need to prove their planned cost structures. Musselwhite delivers established, high-grade underground production. Camino Rojo is a relatively low-cost heap-leach operation with a large sulphide option. Nicaragua uses a flexible hub-and-spoke system. Mesquite, by contrast, is a mature, shorter-life asset.
These differences are critical for valuation: a group-wide AISC or blanket production multiple would poorly reflect reality. Equinox therefore has to be valued asset by asset.
Gold production · organic growth · optionality
Canada · cornerstone asset · ongoing normalization
Canada · new producing mine
Canada · high-grade underground producer
Mexico · oxide heap-leach mine
Nicaragua · multiple ore sources and centralized processing
USA · established producer
Canada · ~48 koz additional annual production
Nevada · ~130 koz potential annual production
California · ~220 koz potential annual production
Mexico · ~215 koz · sulphide/concentrate project
Mexico · ~280 koz potential annual production
Canada · additional deposits and new discoveries
Canada · underground and regional potential
Canada · near-mine exploration and extensions
Exploration across existing assets focused on resource growth and mine-life extensions.
The first two columns deliberately follow Equinox Gold’s own portfolio structure: six producing mines or operating complexes and the disclosed growth projects. The third column is our analytical layer. For valuation, existing mines form the operating core, growth projects are valued separately according to development stage and risk, while exploration remains optionality.
Ontario · Open Pit · CIL
With more than five million ounces of reserves, 27,000 t/d design throughput and roughly 15 years of initial mine life, Greenstone is the largest producing mine in the current Equinox portfolio. The key question is no longer whether the mine can be built, but whether Equinox can sustainably bring it to the originally expected performance level.
Greenstone was built from 2021 as a 60/40 joint venture between Equinox Gold and Orion Mine Finance. Construction was substantially complete by the end of 2023. In May 2024, Equinox acquired Orion’s 40% interest and consolidated 100% of the mine; first gold was poured on May 22 and commercial production was declared on November 6, 2024.
Technically, Greenstone is not an exotic project: a large conventional open pit with a leach/carbon-in-pulp plant and long-term recovery of roughly 87%. That makes execution, rather than metallurgy, the core investment question. At a reserve grade of only 0.93 g/t, very large volumes of material must be moved and processed reliably.
Equinox initially planned 2025 production of 300–350 koz at only 1.045–1.145 $/oz AISC. In June, guidance was reduced to 220–260 koz and expected AISC was raised to 1.700–1.800 $/oz .
Management cited lower productivity and availability of the primary loading fleet, lower mining rates, delayed access to higher-grade ore zones, lower-than-expected grades—partly due to higher dilution—and throughput and recovery still below plan. Greenstone therefore illustrates why a completed large-scale operation is not automatically a normalized cash-flow producer.
First gold in May, commercial production in November. 111,710 oz produced in the first partial year.
Original: 300–350 koz at $1,045–1,145/oz AISC. Later: 220–260 koz at $1,700–1,800/oz.
Q1: 180,248 t/d mining and 24,544 t/d mill throughput; above 27,000 t/d on 51% of operating days.
Technical Report: roughly 320 koz per year on average over the next ten years.
In Q1 2026, mill throughput averaged 24,544 t/d—still about 9% below design. At the same time, the plant exceeded its 27,000 t/d nameplate rate on 51% of operating days. That points less to a hard technical capacity limit than to the challenge of sustaining that performance consistently.
The mining rate also improved to an average of 180,248 t/d. The key is therefore not a single record day, but whether mining, grades, throughput and recovery stabilize simultaneously.
Most of the capital has been invested and the plant exists. The central lever is the normalization of the existing operation. If Greenstone can move from 2026 guidance of 250–275 koz toward the long-term profile of roughly 320 koz at normalized unit costs, it can become a cash-flow anchor. If throughput, grades or costs structurally remain below the Technical Report assumptions, the portfolio’s largest asset would be worth less than it appears on paper.
The Technical Report also outlines an underground resource of roughly 1.66 Moz M&I at 2.34 g/t and 1.25 Moz Inferred at 2.37 g/t Equinox is also studying an increase in mill throughput toward 30,000 t/d and regional targets across the roughly 400 km² land package.
For our NAV, the 27,000 t/d operation should work first. Underground mining, higher throughput and satellites are potential upside—not prerequisites for economically justifying Greenstone. Valuation note: Part of Greenstone’s already defined underground M&I resource is already included in our Base NAV at a steep discount through Category D; additional unvalued upside remains from further conversion, additional inferred/exploration resources and a future, more defined expansion plan.
Newfoundland & Labrador · Open Pit · CIL
Valentine is Equinox Gold’s newest mine—and already one of its most important growth projects. The plant reached commercial production only a few months after first gold. While still ramping up, Equinox approved the Phase 2 expansion: throughput is set to double, while exploration at Frank and the new Minotaur discovery suggests Valentine could ultimately become much more than the current mine plan.
Valentine is located in central Newfoundland along a roughly 32-kilometre mineralized trend. Equinox acquired the project with Calibre Mining in June 2025 while commissioning was already underway. Ore processing began in August, first gold was poured in September, and commercial production was achieved in late November 2025. The plant ramp-up has been materially smoother than at Greenstone.
The current mine is a conventional open pit with crush-grind-CIL processing. By the end of 2025, the plant was averaging 90% of its 6,850 t/d nameplate rate for the quarter and exceeded nameplate on more than 47% of operating days. Recovery during the 60 days before commercial production was declared already exceeded 93%. The process route therefore does not require especially deep technical treatment in our analysis.
In Q1 2026, throughput averaged 6,192 t/d, or roughly 90% of nameplate capacity. Across February and March, the plant already averaged about 101% of design capacity. That is an important difference from Greenstone: so far there is little evidence that Valentine’s process plant itself is a structural bottleneck.
Nevertheless, 2026 guidance is only 140–150 koz at $2,000–2,200/oz AISC. The near-term investment case therefore depends more on mine development, ore availability and grades keeping pace with a plant that is already performing well. High 2026 AISC should not automatically be used as the long-term cost base.
On August 5, 2026, the Board approved construction of Phase 2. For $436 million of initial capital processing capacity is expected to increase from 2.5 to 5.0 million tonnes per year, or roughly 13,700 t/d. The scope includes a second crushing line, an additional ball mill, a pebble crusher, a larger mining fleet and additional site infrastructure. Construction is expected to take 24 months, with completion targeted for late 2028.
At first glance, the relationship looks unusual: +100% throughput, but only about +25% annual production. That is not a contradiction, but a consequence of the mine plan. Phase 2 allows materially more tonnes to be processed while long-term feed does not sustain the higher grades of the early years. The expansion is therefore not only about maximizing peak production, but also about processing the large reserve base faster and more efficiently.
The expansion should not be judged by a simplistic “capex per additional annual ounce” metric. Phase 2 changes the entire mining and processing rhythm of the operation. The current plan calls for an average of roughly 223 koz per year from 2026 to 2036; over the 2026–2037 mine life, average cash costs of $1,580/oz and AISC of $1,665/oz are expected. Our DCF therefore needs to compare cash flow with and without Phase 2, especially the pull-forward of production, additional fleet, sustaining capital and the residual value of infrastructure.
Frank lies southwest of the existing Leprechaun pit along the Valentine Lake Shear Zone trend and is not yet included in the current resource estimate. Drilling shows broad, continuous mineralized zones; Equinox sees potential for an additional open pit that could extend production and mine life beyond the current plan.
This is qualitatively different optionality from a remote greenfield project: Frank lies along an established mining district with an existing mill and infrastructure. Successful resource definition could therefore feed relatively directly into a future mine plan.
Minotaur was first drilled only in 2025 and lies roughly eight kilometres northwest of the mill. Initial drilling defined mineralization over about 700 metres of strike; step-outs suggest a potential system roughly two kilometres long. Equinox reported at Minotaur including 2.68 g/t over 32 m and 5.74 g/t over 8 m. The especially high-grade intercepts of 3.12 g/t over 63.9 m and 22.10 g/t over 6.3 m, however, come from the Frank Zone .
The discovery process is also notable: the target was prioritized by combining conventional geology with VRIFY’s AI-supported DORA analysis. For 2026, 15,000–20,000 metres of drilling are planned at Minotaur alone. There is still no resource estimate, so we treat Minotaur as exploration upside, not NAV ounces.
Reserve base and current mine plan.
Broad mineralization outside current resources; potential fourth open pit.
8 km from the mill, early stage, no resource yet.
320 km² – roughly 100 km of drilling planned for 2026.
Valentine is not simply another new mine. The current operation has so far delivered a relatively smooth plant ramp-up, Phase 2 is set to double infrastructure by the end of 2028, and new exploration targets are emerging along the trend. Its potential value therefore sits on three levels: existing production, already approved brownfield growth and district optionality. For Base NAV, only the current mine plan and approved Phase 2 belong in the model initially; Frank and especially Minotaur should be treated separately as upside.
Ontario · Underground · Sulphide
Musselwhite is the counterpoint to Greenstone and Valentine. No new large mine needs to be ramped up here: the operation has produced for roughly 28 years and only joined Equinox through the Orla merger. Even so, Musselwhite still has 1.45 million ounces of reserves at 5.18 g/t. The central question is therefore not ramp-up, but how long this existing high-grade underground mine can continue replacing reserves and using its infrastructure.
Musselwhite is an established underground mine in northern Ontario. It is strategically important to Equinox because it adds a mature, high-grade operation to the Canadian portfolio. The reserve base contains 8.72 million tonnes at 5.18 g/t—materially higher grades than at Greenstone or Valentine.
Equinox’s current guidance of 100–110 koz covers only the five months from August through December 2026 because the Orla transaction closed on July 31. Before the merger, the midpoint of full-year guidance was roughly 235 koz. These two figures should therefore not be confused.
Processing is not the complicated part of the analysis. The key is underground mine development: high-grade ounces only generate cash flow if new mining areas are opened in time. Development metres, stope sequencing, dilution and continuous access to new ore blocks determine whether the high reserve grades reliably reach the plant.
This also explains why sustaining capital at a mature underground mine cannot be treated as a minor maintenance expense. Part of that spending is what keeps the future production profile open in the first place. Our DCF therefore has to consider mine development and reserve replacement together.
An exceptionally long operating track record.
8.72 Mt at 5.18 g/t.
0.87 Moz M&I plus 0.55 Moz Inferred outside reserves.
Reserve conversion and extensions along the trend determine residual value.
Outside reserves, Musselwhite contains an additional 869 koz M&I at 3.52 g/t and 552 koz Inferred at 4.06 g/t These resources are not automatically economic and should not be included one-for-one in Base NAV. At an existing underground mine with shaft, development and processing infrastructure, however, nearby resources have a different strategic value than the same ounces at an undeveloped greenfield project.
Equinox accordingly identifies three growth levers: additional mill capacity, near-mine deposits and further extensions of the underground orebody along trend. The key lever is therefore less a new billion-dollar project than how much additional ore the existing infrastructure can unlock.
Within the Canadian trio, Musselwhite is the established counterpart to the two ramp-up assets Greenstone and Valentine. The mine provides high grades and established production, while additional value can primarily come from longer mine life. We therefore use the confirmed reserve plan as the conservative base and treat additional resources and future mine-life extensions separately. After 28 years of production it would be too aggressive to assume perpetual reserve replacement—but equally wrong to assign zero residual value to existing infrastructure once today’s reserves are exhausted.
¹ ~235 koz represents the midpoint of Musselwhite’s pre-merger 2026 full-year guidance. Equinox’s current guidance of 100–110 koz covers only the Equinox-attributable August–December 2026 period.
Zacatecas · Heap Leach · Underground Sulphides
Camino Rojo is one of the most technically interesting assets in the Equinox portfolio. A simple, low-cost oxide heap-leach mine has operated at surface since 2022. Directly below it lies a much larger, higher-grade sulphide deposit. It cannot be processed through the same route and would effectively create a second, standalone underground mine with its own plant.
Camino Rojo is located in the Mexican state of Zacatecas. Orla Mining acquired the project from Goldcorp in 2017, began construction of the oxide mine in late 2020, poured first gold in December 2021 and declared commercial production effective April 1, 2022. The current operation is a conventional open pit with crushing and heap leaching. The plant was designed for roughly 18,000 t/d of stacking capacity and has repeatedly operated above nameplate since ramp-up.
Current Equinox guidance of 55–65 koz covers only the five months from August through December 2026. On a full-year basis, Camino Rojo had guidance of roughly 115 koz before the merger. With AISC of only $950–1,050/oz for the Equinox-attributable period, the oxide mine is currently one of the lowest-cost operations in the group.
Oxide ore is mined, crushed and stacked on leach pads. Cyanide solution recovers the gold from the rock over time. This route is materially simpler in both capital and operating terms than a conventional mill or pressure-oxidation process. For current Camino Rojo cash flow, the key variables are mining rate, grade, crush/stack throughput, leach kinetics and recovery.
The current P&P reserve base is relatively small at roughly 0.76 Moz. The asset’s strategic value therefore comes not only from the remaining oxide mine, but from what lies below it: an M&I gold resource in the underground project more than five times larger.
The geometallurgical model divides the underground resource into non-refractory, refractory and Zone 22 domains. Roughly 80% of tonnage is refractory material. The gold is mineralogically locked in a way that makes direct cyanide leaching insufficient.
Earlier concepts therefore contemplated pre-treatment using Pressure Oxidation (POX). The 2026 PEA proposes a different route: ore would be ground and separated through multiple selective flotation stages. Rather than fully processing refractory material to doré on site, Camino Rojo would produce saleable concentrates.
SAG mill, pebble crusher and ball mill.
Carbon, gold, zinc and arsenopyrite flotation.
Gold, zinc and pyrite concentrates are produced separately.
Gold and zinc containerized; pyrite as bulk concentrate.
POX could technically unlock refractory ore, but would be capital intensive. The PEA therefore favors selling three concentrates. That initially reduces on-site processing capex, but shifts part of the risk to payables, treatment charges, impurity penalties, transport and available smelter/processor capacity. These commercial assumptions are exactly what must be tested critically in valuation.
The PEA outlines a separate underground operation with one portal and two main ramps. Cemented rock fill would be used in pre-production, followed later by paste backfill. Planned plant throughput is 8,000 t/d. The conceptual feed totals 37.2 million tonnes at an average 2.70 g/t gold; roughly 87% of the gold is expected to report to concentrate.
Over the first ten years, the study expects an average of 215 koz of gold production per year, of which about 190 koz would be payable gold. Over 17 years, total production is estimated at 2.80 Moz, with 2.48 Moz payable.
The PEA estimates initial capex at roughly $608 million: $306 million for the process plant, $203 million for mine development and roughly $87 million of contingency. An additional ~$489 million of sustaining capital is estimated over the mine life, much of it further underground development.
At $3,100 gold, the study reports an after-tax NPV5 of roughly $1.275 billion and a 30.2% IRR. At $2,500 gold, the stated NPV5 is $638 million; at $4,000, $2.231 billion; and at $5,000, $3.342 billion.
The underground M&I resource contains 49.3 million tonnes at 2.53 g/t, or 4.01 Moz of gold; an additional 0.34 Moz is Inferred. The PEA mine plan uses roughly 33.0 million tonnes of M&I feed plus 2.8 million tonnes of Inferred material and dilution. The study is therefore explicitly preliminary.
Additional risks include concentrate specifications, arsenic and other impurity limits, actual payables, treatment charges, transport costs, metallurgy of individual domains, underground geotechnics, and the paste-backfill and tailings solutions. The PEA classifies initial capex at Class 4 accuracy of only about ±30–40%.
Economically, Camino Rojo consists of two clearly separate assets. The oxide mine is an existing, relatively low-cost cash-flow producer and belongs fully in our Base DCF. The 2% NSR is not deducted again separately because royalties are already reflected in the operating cost/AISC basis used. The underground project, by contrast, has exceptional potential but is not yet sufficiently de-risked technically and commercially to simply adopt the published PEA NPV.
Newmont back-in: Contractual back-in rights apply to the sulphides. If processing were routed through Peñasquito, Newmont could obtain 70% of the sulphide project; for a standalone project, a 60% back-in applies only under defined contractual conditions, including a mine plan with at least 500 Mt of P&P reserves. Our Base Case therefore assumes the currently studied standalone underground approach at 100% Equinox and treats the back-in as a project risk rather than a blanket ownership deduction. The current PEA mine base is far below the 500 Mt threshold. The concentrate strategy remains particularly important: it avoids a dedicated POX plant but creates new dependencies on external buyers and treatment terms.
Limon · Libertad · Pavon · Eastern Borosi
The Nicaragua Operations are not a single mine, but a network of open-pit and underground ore sources feeding two existing CIL plants. That is the key economic feature: new deposits do not necessarily need to justify a standalone mill and can instead be connected as additional “spokes” to existing infrastructure.
El Limon has roughly 0.5 Mtpa of processing capacity; Libertad is larger at 2.25 Mtpa and serves as the regional processing hub. Equinox states recoveries of roughly 94–95% for both plants under normal conditions. In the first half of 2026, however, reported combined recovery was only 90.7% —a reminder that feed mix and operating reality matter more for valuation than theoretical plant performance.
Ore sources are geographically dispersed. Around Limon, feed comes from Limon Central as well as the Santa Pancha, Panteon and Veta Nueva underground mines; Libertad processes material from Jabali, Pavon and Eastern Borosi, among others. Pavon illustrates the model especially well: the ore is hauled roughly 300 kilometres by road to the Libertad mill. That logistics chain would make little sense for low-grade material, but at sufficiently high grades the existing, partly underutilized mill capacity can more than offset transport costs.
2026 AISC guidance of $2,000–2,100/oz is well above recent years. At the same time, Equinox is investing unusually heavily: $115–125 million Growth Capital and another $25–30 million Exploration are planned for Nicaragua. The capital is directed mainly to capitalized stripping for new open pits, underground development, additional equipment and infrastructure. In the first half of 2026, the open-pit strip ratio was as high as roughly 26:1. We therefore should not simply extrapolate 2026 as a permanent cost base in the DCF—but neither should we automatically revert to materially lower historical AISC.
Current P&P reserves of 1.17 Moz at 4.01 g/t represent only about five years of output at roughly 225–250 koz of annual production. In addition, there are roughly 0.90 Moz M&I outside reserves and about 1.01 Moz Inferred in the operating areas. Separate Inferred resources also include Cerro Aeropuerto at roughly 0.71 Moz and Primavera at roughly 0.78 Moz.
The key is therefore not only current reserve life, but whether Equinox can continuously discover, define, permit and feed new high-grade spokes into existing infrastructure. In 2026, eleven drill rigs are operating across Limon, Libertad and Eastern Borosi; more than 53,000 metres were drilled in the first half alone. Successful reserve replacement could extend the life of the central mills well beyond currently stated reserves.
Nicaragua is economically attractive for Equinox but politically clearly riskier than Canada, the United States or Mexico. The U.S. expanded its sanctions authorities over Nicaragua’s gold sector in 2022 and sanctioned additional gold-sector-linked companies and officials in April 2026. Equinox itself explicitly identifies potential further sanctions, restrictions on business relationships and capital repatriation as risks. As of now, Equinox’s operations themselves are not subject to the cited OFAC measures; nevertheless, the jurisdiction justifies a higher discount rate and more conservative weighting of long-term exploration optionality in our NAV.
Nicaragua is not a classic long-life mine plan that can be modeled once and then simply depleted. Its value comes from an existing processing platform, which can repeatedly absorb new ore sources. If reserve replacement succeeds at reasonable development cost, the complex can be longer-lived and more valuable than today’s reserve life suggests. If conversion fails—or the political or sanctions environment worsens—value could shrink much faster than at Equinox’s Canadian cornerstone assets.
Imperial County · Open Pit · Run-of-Mine Heap Leach
Mesquite is the counterpoint to Equinox’s new large Canadian mines. The open pit has operated since 1986, produced more than five million ounces of gold and requires neither a mill nor complex metallurgy. On paper, the asset is now small, expensive and reserve-light. Economically, however, Mesquite has repeatedly extended its life through new pits, resource conversion and reassessment of previously moved material.
Mesquite operates as a conventional open pit, but processing is exceptionally simple: mined ore is hauled directly to the leach pads as run-of-mine material and leached with cyanide solution. There is no conventional crushing and grinding stage. This reduces process complexity, but at a reserve grade of only 0.38 g/t the economics are extremely sensitive to mining costs, strip ratio, haul distances and actual metallurgical recovery.
Recovery matters more at Mesquite than the large resource-ounce figure initially suggests. Equinox cites average recovery of roughly 75% for oxide ore, but only around 35% for non-oxide material; the typical leach cycle lasts roughly 90 days. After final stacking, the existing pads can also continue generating residual production for two to three years. A resource ounce at Mesquite is therefore not automatically worth the same as a resource ounce in a CIL mine—oxidation state, location and leach behavior determine how many geological ounces can actually be monetized economically.
In 2026, the most important new feed comes from Brownie 4. Ore was stacked from Q1 onward, but ounces recovered from it appear with a delay because of the leach curve. As a result, Mesquite produced only 31.7 koz in the first half; Equinox expects the larger share of annual production in the second half.
At the same time, costs for the next ore phase often occur before the associated gold ounces. In the first half of 2026 alone, sustaining expenditures were $16.6 million, mainly for capitalized stripping at Brownie 4. Higher diesel prices and major component maintenance on part of the haul-truck fleet added further costs. This explains why Mesquite AISC can swing sharply from year to year and why a single year is only of limited use as a long-term normalized cost base.
Reported P&P reserves of roughly 275 koz represent only about three to four years of gross output at today’s production rate. Outside reserves, however, there are another 1.09 Moz M&I at 0.41 g/t —roughly four times as many ounces as in the reserve base—plus about 58 koz Inferred. Equinox has repeatedly extended mine life since the 2018 acquisition, including by drilling historical waste dumps and old leach pads and by identifying new mineralized zones at and between existing pits.
This strategy continues in 2026: in the first half, more than 15 kilometres of RC drilling was completed, including around the margins of the Ginger Pit and between Vista and Rainbow. The goal is less a spectacular new discovery than the steady conversion of additional nearby tonnes into economically mineable feed for existing infrastructure.
Mesquite has materially more resources than reserves—real optionality, but not a free mine plan. Some of the material is extremely low grade or metallurgically less attractive; new pits require stripping, permits and additional leach-pad capacity. We therefore fully model the confirmed reserve plan and only recognize resource conversion beyond it where location, oxidation state, drilling and concrete development work make it plausible. The remainder is treated as option value.
Mesquite is no longer a cornerstone asset within Equinox. Production and reserves are too small and costs too high. Even so, the mine can still generate substantial cash flow for several years at high gold prices because the heap-leach infrastructure already exists and the resource base is much larger than current reserves. In the SOTP, Mesquite therefore belongs as a conservatively valued remaining-life cash flow plus limited conversion optionality —not as a long-term quality anchor, but also not with zero residual value once today’s reserves are exhausted.
Canada · USA · Mexico
Following the Orla merger, Equinox has an unusually broad organic growth pipeline. For valuation, however, these projects must be clearly separated from existing mines: Valentine Phase 2 is already approved, South Railroad is under construction following the Federal ROD, while Castle Mountain, Los Filos and Camino Rojo Underground still carry materially greater permitting, study and execution risk.
Brownfield growth with the lowest development risk. Throughput is expected to rise from 2.5 to 5.0 Mtpa. Equinox expects roughly +48 koz/year of additional production; approved initial capex is $436 million. Because the mine, deposits and key infrastructure already exist, Phase 2 belongs largely in our Base Case.
The most de-risked greenfield build in the pipeline. The Nevada heap-leach project contains roughly 1.5 Moz of reserves. The 2026 FS forecasts approximately 130 koz/year during the first five years at $1,485/oz AISC and $395 million of initial capex. Following the positive Federal ROD on August 17, 2026, early works are underway; first gold is targeted for 2028. For NAV, South Railroad is therefore closer to a construction project than a conventional development option.
Silver stream already in the model: 100% of recovered silver is delivered for 15% of the prevailing spot price. The FS already reflects this burden through the very small silver by-product credit; disclosed royalties are also included in the study economics. Therefore our DCF applies no second stream or royalty deduction .
Large reserve, but no reliable current cost base yet. Castle Mountain contains roughly 4.1 Moz of reserves; the 2021 FS outlined average production of 218 koz/year over 14 years. The critical issues now are the Federal ROD and ongoing updates to engineering and economics. The old FS shows the scale of the asset, but should not be carried into NAV without adjustment.
Enormous geological value meets high execution and social complexity. Following new 20-year agreements with all three host communities, Equinox is preparing the heap-leach restart. The reserve base is roughly 5.35 Moz, with an additional 7.90 Moz M&I. The 2022 FS, including a CIL plant and Bermejal Underground, envisaged roughly 280 koz/year over 14.5 years. We treat that study only as a starting point: costs, expansion concept and restart assumptions need to be reconfirmed.
The largest technical option beneath an existing producing mine. Below the oxide open pit lie roughly 3.8 Moz of Indicated sulphide resources. The 2026 PEA outlines about 215 koz/a during the first ten years, but requires a new underground mine and a complex concentrate route. Until the PFS, Camino Rojo Underground therefore remains a separately risk-weighted upside component.
Frank and Minotaur at Valentine, Greenstone satellites, Hasaga, Golden Eagle and the large Nicaraguan exploration areas could add ounces over time. Until they form part of a robust mine plan, we treat them as separate optionality rather than regular production value.
The more than 800 koz of potential additional production is not one homogeneous block. Valentine Phase 2 and South Railroad are advanced enough to enter NAV at high weight. Castle Mountain requires updated economics, Los Filos a robust restart and expansion plan, and Camino Rojo Underground further technical de-risking. These different stages of maturity matter more to our SOTP valuation than the simple sum of potential ounces.
Valuation does not start with a multiple, but with the production profile. The key is which ounces are covered by existing mine plans, which depend on reserve and resource conversion, and which require additional project capital. This is how we separate robust mine value from development and exploration optionality.
A unified framework for determining net asset value (NAV) on minenwerte.de.
Robust reserve-backed production is valued in full through an asset DCF.
Brownfield expansions of operating assets are valued in full. Fully permitted greenfield projects under construction receive a small discount for remaining construction and ramp-up risk.
Standalone project DCF with an individual discount for permitting, construction, financing and execution risk.
Defined resources not yet included in a robust production plan receive only a conservative optionality value.
Valued at 0 in Base NAV. Potential value remains additional upside.
The percentages are valuation factors, not probabilities of occurrence or conversion. For development projects, the factor primarily reflects permitting, construction, financing and execution risks. For M&I resources, it reflects conversion risk, timing, additional capex and the lack of detailed planning.
Transparency & Comparability: Every valuation on minenwerte.de follows this standard. Any deviations are explained and disclosed in the relevant section.
Equinox consolidates Musselwhite and Camino Rojo only from August 1, 2026. For valuation, however, we care about the economic earning power of the current portfolio. Therefore the 2026 production plan is shown on a 12-month pro forma basis. On a 12-month basis, the combined production capacity of the six current mines is roughly 1,1 Moz. Official Equinox guidance of 870–920 koz includes Musselwhite and Camino Rojo only for August through December.
Six current production assets, with Greenstone and Valentine still ramping up.
Greenstone, Valentine and Musselwhite provide the most robust long-term production base.
At Musselwhite, Nicaragua and Mesquite, reserve replacement becomes critical to long-term NAV.
| Asset · koz Au | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 | 2032 | 2033 | 2034 | 2035 | 2036 | 2037 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greenstone | 263 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | ~326 | beyond |
| Valentine | 145 | ~213 | ~213 | ~249 | ~225 | ~201 | ~204 | ~240 | ~207 | ~221 | ~267 | ~125 |
| Musselwhite | ~227 | 193 | 244 | 176 | 181 | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion |
| Camino Rojo OP | 122 | 113 | 111 | 93 | 35 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Nicaragua | 238 | ~235 | ~230 | ~225 | ~210 | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion |
| Mesquite | 75 | ~75 | ~70 | ~55 | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | Conversion | – | – | – |
Working model, not yet a DCF. Figures marked “~” are Minenwerte normalizations or values derived from published averages, reserves or mine-plan data. “Conversion” deliberately means that we do not assume production until we have decided how much of the resource base belongs economically in Base NAV and at what valuation factor.
This is where visibility is clearest. According to the current Technical Report, Greenstone is expected to produce an average of roughly 320 koz per year from 2026 to 2036; processing in the mine plan continues through 2043. Valentine has a detailed annual plan through 2037. Phase 2 lifts throughput to roughly 5 Mtpa from 2029 and is therefore already part of our Base Case.
The published reserve mine plan currently extends only through 2030 even though, at the end of 2025, the mine already had 1.45 Moz reserves plus 0.87 Moz M&I and 0.55 Moz Inferred. A hard production stop in 2030 would therefore be just as aggressive as assuming 200+ koz indefinitely. We value the reserve plan in full through DCF; M&I resources outside reserves then receive only the standardized, heavily discounted Category D optionality value.
The open-pit plan is unusually transparent: roughly 122 / 113 / 111 / 93 / 35 koz from 2026 through 2030. The current oxide mine plan ends after that. The underground project is therefore not mixed into this production series, but added separately later as a growth DCF with capex and development risk.
False precision would be dangerous for both assets. Nicaragua has 1.17 Moz of reserves plus a large resource and satellite base; Mesquite has only 275 koz of reserves but 1.09 Moz M&I. For both, we therefore separate the visible production base from M&I optionality outside the mine plan; additional production years are not assumed.
Equinox does not need the large development projects to remain a major producer in the near term. The current portfolio base is already around 1.1 Moz. But without reserve replacement at Musselwhite, Nicaragua and Mesquite, and without new projects, production would visibly decline toward the end of the decade. That is exactly why existing mine plans, M&I optionality and growth projects must be valued separately in NAV.
Current guidance matters for near-term cash flow, but is partly unsuitable as a long-term DCF cost base. Greenstone and Valentine are still ramping up, while Nicaragua and Mesquite are in stripping- and development-intensive phases. We therefore separate current AISC from a normalized, long-term plausible cost base.
| Asset | 2026 AISC | Long-Term DCF AISC | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greenstone | $1,900–2,000/oz | ~$1,650/oz | LOM opex around $1,325/oz; high 2026 capex/ramp-up costs should not be extrapolated indefinitely. |
| Valentine | $2,000–2,200/oz | $1,665/oz | Directly from the 2026 Technical Report, including Phase 2 as LOM AISC. |
| Musselwhite | $1,700–1,800/oz | ~$1,550/oz | Normalized between 2025 actual ($1,618/oz), current guidance and the older reserve LOM ($1,269/oz). |
| Camino Rojo OP | $950–1,050/oz* | ~$1,200/oz | Orla 2026 full-year guidance was $1,150–1,250/oz; Equinox shows only the lower-cost five months Aug–Dec. |
| Nicaragua | $2,000–2,100/oz | ~$1,650/oz | 2025 actual $1,551/oz; 2026 includes unusually high stripping and development activity. |
| Mesquite | $2,500–2,600/oz | ~$1,900/oz | Cyclical heap-leach/stripping profile: 2024 $1,306, 2025 $1,885, 2026 materially higher. |
* Updated Equinox guidance for Camino Rojo covers only August through December 2026. Long-term DCF AISC is not company guidance but a Minenwerte working assumption. All values are in US dollars per ounce sold.
The column “Long-Term DCF AISC” shows our normalized cost assumption for long-term mine operations—not profit or cash flow. Gold price minus DCF AISC initially yields only the modeled AISC margin. Taxes, separately incurred growth capex and corporate G&A are considered afterwards. Percentage royalties also move with the gold price.
The new Technical Report shows roughly $1,325/oz operating costs and approximately $1.32 billion of sustaining capital across the current mine plan. That implies a long-term cost base in the mid-$1,600/oz range. 2026 guidance of $1,900–2,000/oz still includes the effects of ramp-up and high current investment. For the DCF we provisionally use $1,650/oz .
There is little need to estimate here. The updated Technical Report gives average LOM cash costs for Phase 1 + Phase 2 of $1,580/oz and AISC of $1,665/oz. The very high current 2026 guidance reflects ramp-up; for the long-term DCF we therefore adopt the published LOM AISC.
Musselwhite produced at $1,618/oz AISC in 2025; the 2024 Technical Report showed LOM AISC of $1,269/oz on the cost base used at the time. We choose ~$1,550/oz as a deliberately more conservative midpoint. Camino Rojo remains the portfolio’s cost anchor: Orla had guided to $1,150–1,250/oz AISC for full-year 2026, which is why ~$1,200/oz forms our base assumption.
Nicaragua achieved $1,551/oz AISC in 2025, while 2026 is simultaneously pre-funding new pits, underground development and infrastructure. ~$1,650/oz appears conservative as a normalized assumption. At Mesquite, AISC swings sharply with stripping cycles—from $1,306/oz in 2024 to $1,885/oz in 2025 and guidance of $2,500–2,600/oz in 2026. We therefore use ~$1,900/oz, rather than extrapolating a single year.
The calculation here is simply $4,000 gold price minus long-term DCF AISC. These AISC margins are not NAV and not forecast free cash flow; taxes, growth capex and corporate G&A are applied in subsequent calculation steps.
In our view, the current group AISC of roughly $1,900–2,000/oz understates the portfolio’s long-term earnings power if extrapolated unchanged. At the same time, using historical low-cost levels everywhere would be too aggressive. Our Base Case therefore generally lands between $1,550 and $1,900/oz for the core assets—with Camino Rojo materially below. The next step is to combine these costs with the annual production profile, growth capex, taxes and royalties into a true asset DCF.
Additional M&I resources at an existing mine are economically relevant, but cannot be treated like reserves. Our standard therefore derives their value from the already modeled reserve DCF of the same asset and recognizes only a small, asset-specific share. This automatically keeps gold price, cost structure, jurisdiction and discount rate of each asset embedded in the valuation.
Optionality value = M&I ounces outside reserves × NAV per reserve ounce × resource factor. NAV per reserve ounce comes from the relevant asset DCF and therefore changes with the gold price. The resource factor is not an assumed conversion rate. A 20% factor does not mean we expect 20% of the resource to convert to reserves. It is a combined valuation discount for conversion risk, timing, still-unknown additional capex and lack of detailed planning. Inferred resources remain entirely outside Base NAV. For M&I optionality tied to a Category C project, we deliberately use the already risk-weighted project NAV per reserve ounce as the reference value. This preserves project-specific development risk for the additional resources; the D factor is not applied to an unfiltered technical project value.
Existing 27 ktpd CIL plant, very large M&I base and resource grade above reserve grade; additional mine plan not yet defined.
Existing and already expanding mine complex. Phase 2 is included in the regular DCF; only M&I outside that plan is counted here.
Highest factor: 3.52 g/t, existing underground infrastructure and a long history of successful resource conversion.
Hub-and-spoke infrastructure and 2.7 Mtpa of existing CIL capacity are valuable; political, sanctions and execution risk limit the recognized value.
Conservative brownfield factor despite existing heap-leach infrastructure; low grade and additional stripping, leach-pad and permitting needs limit value.
Only M&I outside reserves; the reserve/project value itself remains separately weighted at 45% in Category C.
30% represents very high-quality brownfield optionality with existing infrastructure and high technical proximity to conversion. 20% is used for good brownfield resources whose additional mine plan and capex are not yet sufficiently defined. 15% also reflects elevated jurisdictional or execution risk; 10% represents resources with materially greater technical or economic conversion hurdles. This scale will be applied consistently across producers on minenwerte.de.
| Resource Optionality · USD millions | M&I ex Res. | Factor | $2,500 | $4,000 | $5,500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Greenstone | 2.966 Moz | 20% | ~211 | ~603 | ~996 |
| Valentine | 1.169 Moz | 20% | ~64 | ~217 | ~369 |
| Musselwhite | 0.869 Moz | 30% | ~84 | ~220 | ~355 |
| Nicaragua Operations | 0.904 Moz | 15% | ~42 | ~129 | ~216 |
| Mesquite | 1.091 Moz | 15% | ~42 | ~156 | ~272 |
| Los Filos | 7.897 Moz | 15% | ~113 | ~319 | ~527 |
| Resource Optionality | – | – | ~556 | ~1.644 | ~2.726 |
| Total Asset SOTP | – | – | ~6.154 | ~18.213 | ~30.261 |
Greenstone calculation example in the Base Case: $5.425bn reserve/mine-plan NAV ÷ 5.334 Moz reserves = roughly $1,017 NAV per reserve ounce. × 2.966 Moz M&I outside reserves × 20% resource factor = roughly $603 million optionality value. This gives the resource real value without treating it as if it were already fully converted and scheduled.
We do not invent a hypothetical second production plan for the resource. Instead, we link it to the already fully modeled economics of the same mine. A resource ounce at a highly profitable mine therefore automatically receives more value than at a weak asset—and the value responds consistently to our three gold-price scenarios.
Musselwhite has 869 koz M&I at 3.52 g/t outside reserves. The resource is constrained in stope shapes; the mine has existing underground infrastructure and a long history of resource growth and conversion. Even so, we recognize only 30% of reserve NAV per ounce.
Greenstone has an enormous additional M&I base of 2.966 Moz at 1.71 g/t, materially above the average reserve grade of 0.93 g/t. But the timing of additional mining, open-pit/underground mix and required capex are not sufficiently defined. The factor therefore deliberately remains at 20%.
Inferred resources have a lower level of geological confidence and cannot be converted directly into reserves. They matter to the investment thesis, but not to Base NAV. This prevents large exploration portfolios from making companies appear artificially cheap in comparisons.
The standard increases Base Case optionality value relative to our old extension model to roughly $1.64bn. This is mainly because Greenstone and Valentine are now treated consistently. At the same time, the method becomes more conservative: no additional production years are invented, Inferred remains at zero and every M&I ounce receives only a fraction of the already demonstrated reserve NAV per ounce.
Equinox has a materially stronger portfolio today than only a few years ago. At the same time, a significant share of future value depends on successful ramp-ups, lower costs, reserve replacement and disciplined execution of several large projects. The main opportunities and risks are therefore two sides of the same investment thesis.
Ramp-up, higher throughput and falling unit costs.
Construction progress toward planned first production.
New technical data can confirm—or reduce—billions of project value.
Greenstone and Valentine are not yet in their long-term normal state in 2026. If they ramp to design capacity and Valentine Phase 2 follows successfully, production is not the only benefit: fixed costs are spread across materially more ounces. This is the most important near-term operating lever in our DCF.
South Railroad is already substantially de-risked; Castle Mountain, Camino Rojo Underground and Los Filos each have the potential to structurally lift group production. Our NAV already includes these projects at discounts. Every successful study, permit and construction decision can reduce that discount and create value before the first ounce is produced.
Musselwhite, Nicaragua and Mesquite have resources outside current reserves and existing infrastructure. Successful conversion extends the use of existing shafts, mills and leach infrastructure. Economically, that can be more valuable than the same number of ounces at a greenfield project.
Our SOTP rises from roughly $6.1bn at $2,500 gold to around $30.0bn at $5,500. The leverage is therefore exceptionally large. If high gold prices prove sustainable while Equinox normalizes costs, a substantial share of incremental revenue can flow through to free cash flow.
Equinox must deliver several things at once. At Greenstone recoveries in Q2 2026 were still around 80%; management cited varying arsenopyrite content among other factors and is working on metallurgical optimization. At Valentine grade reconciliation and mining selectivity remained issues during ramp-up. Add Valentine Phase 2, South Railroad and the planned Los Filos restart. Delays, capex overruns or persistently weaker recoveries would therefore work directly against our normalized DCF assumptions.
Updated 2026 group guidance is $1,900–2,000/oz AISC. Our Base Case assumes lower long-term costs at several assets. That is fundamentally defensible, but not yet a fact. If Greenstone, Valentine, Nicaragua or Mesquite remain structurally more expensive than assumed, NAV would be correspondingly lower.
The Nicaragua Operations are operationally attractive but carry elevated political and sanctions risk. The potential for political unrest to affect operations was already visible in 2018, when protests and road blockades temporarily disrupted supply and production at Libertad and El Limón. Potential conflicts with artisanal and small-scale mining add further risk. Equinox also identifies risks from Canadian and U.S. sanctions targeting Nicaraguan activities. We therefore use the highest discount rate there and strong haircuts on resource conversion.
The PEA avoids a dedicated POX plant and instead relies on selling several concentrates. This creates counterparty and commercial risk around payables, treatment charges, impurity penalties, transport and available smelter/processor capacity. If these commercial terms deteriorate relative to the PEA, project value falls even without any geological deterioration.
A large share of Equity NAV is created at gold prices above our downside scenario. At the same time, several projects compete for capital. Equinox’s advantage is precisely that it does not have to build everything at once. Valentine Phase 2, South Railroad, Castle Mountain, Camino Rojo Underground and Los Filos should be prioritized by risk-adjusted return and balance-sheet capacity. Even good projects can destroy shareholder value if built simultaneously, at excessive cost or with unnecessary dilution.
The mine was already 2020, 2021 and 2022 affected by community disputes and blockades. After the Carrizalillo agreement expired at the end of March 2025, Los Filos was shut down again. The 20-year land access agreements with all three host communities signed in June 2026 are therefore a major de-risking step—but they do not eliminate social-licence risk entirely. Los Filos is also located in Guerrero, a region with elevated general security risk. We explicitly do not assume a specific cartel conflict involving the mine. Until restart, updated economics and expansion become more robust, our project factor remains at 45%.
Here the situation is the opposite: with a current Feasibility Study, positive Federal Record of Decision and early works underway, South Railroad is approaching the status of a real construction project. Progress toward first gold in 2028 can confirm its Category B classification; major delays would work directly against today’s project NAV.
Both projects could materially change the long-term production curve, but are not yet de-risked enough to deserve full NAV. The next technical studies will be especially important: they must show whether today’s higher gold prices truly more than offset higher construction, labor and operating costs.
The pro forma net-cash position after the Orla closing is a clear improvement over earlier Equinox phases of high leverage. It reduces financing pressure. But that advantage only persists if the large growth pipeline is sequenced and funded from cash flow rather than re-leveraging the balance sheet with multiple large projects at once.
Greenstone: Recovery, throughput, grades and AISC.
Valentine: Grade reconciliation, ramp-up and Phase 2 capex.
South Railroad: Construction progress, capex and schedule to first gold.
Los Filos: Restart and stability of the community agreements.
Nicaragua: Sanctions, political developments and access to satellite deposits.
Capital allocation: Sequence growth rather than financing several large projects in parallel.
Equinox has enough gold and enough projects. The key question is how much of it can be converted into free cash flow, at what capital intensity and over what time frame. That is why our Base NAV deliberately avoids front-loading geological optionality and includes development projects only on a risk-weighted basis. If management delivers ramp-ups and project milestones, these discounts can gradually disappear. If execution fails, even a large resource base will not protect value.
The Orla transaction changed Equinox’s portfolio qualitatively. Greenstone, Valentine and Musselwhite now form a long-life Canadian core; Camino Rojo, Mesquite and Nicaragua broaden the existing production base. A company long defined by project construction and transformation has become a producer with roughly 1.1 Moz of combined annual capacity.
Current AISC guidance of $1,900–2,000/oz shows that scale alone does not guarantee high-quality cash flow. Greenstone and Valentine remain in ramp-up, and our lower long-term DCF AISC assumptions still have to be proven in reality across the group. If normalization succeeds, today’s production base creates substantial operating leverage.
Valentine Phase 2, South Railroad, Castle Mountain, Camino Rojo Underground and Los Filos can lift long-term production materially above today’s level. But the goal should not be to reach 1.9 Moz as quickly as possible. Shareholder value is created when Equinox prioritizes projects by risk-adjusted return, funds them from cash flow and avoids overloading the balance sheet with several major projects in parallel.
Alongside roughly 23 Moz of reserves, Equinox has about 25 Moz of M&I resources excluding reserves. Our Base NAV recognizes only clearly defined M&I optionality at existing mines with strong discounts; Inferred and pure exploration remain at zero. This leaves additional mine-life and conversion upside in the portfolio without front-loading it.
Greenstone recovery, Valentine ramp-up, South Railroad construction, Los Filos restart and Nicaragua risk are individually manageable. Together, however, they demand operating discipline. Capital allocation therefore remains the most important corporate issue: Equinox has enough projects—the management team has to choose which ones create the most value per dollar invested.
Our risk-weighted SOTP produces roughly US$4.33 per share at US$2,500 gold, US$13.99 at US$4,000 and US$23.65 at US$5,500. At the closing price on August 21, 2026 of US$13.53 Equinox therefore trades at roughly 0.97× Base NAV; the calculated gap to Base NAV is only about 3.4%. The enormous scenario range remains part of the investment thesis: Equinox has substantial gold-price and project-development leverage on a large production and resource base.
The company has to convert the gold it already owns into free cash flow per share with discipline. That is both the opportunity and the risk today. If cost normalization succeeds and the best growth projects are developed in sequence, Equinox can grow production, mine life and NAV for years. If execution fails, even an exceptional resource base will not protect shareholders from disappointing returns.
With the new portfolio in place, operational reliability matters: Greenstone must sustain its improvement while Valentine stabilizes its ramp-up and delivers against updated guidance.
The long-term land-access agreements provide the foundation. The key question now is how quickly they translate into a credible restart and expansion plan with clear economics.
Following the Orla integration, Equinox has several major growth options. What matters now is which projects are prioritized and how disciplined the funding and execution of that growth will be.