Substance
11.9 Moz reserves + $648m net cashA large reported reserve base and a strong balance sheet provide a solid starting position – even during a period of heavy investment.
Solidcore Resources · Deep Dive · As of August 2026
Solidcore Resources is a Kazakhstan-based gold producer with two operating mines:
Kyzyl and Varvara. The company has
11.9 million ounces of gold-equivalent reserves and is building
Ertis POX its own processing facility for refractory gold concentrates.
At the same time, Solidcore is expanding beyond its traditional gold business through the tin project
Syrymbet as well as the strategic partnership with Bai Tau Minerals and the direct interest in the
Besshoky copper project. Kyzyl in particular, with its exceptionally long-lived, high-grade resource base,
together with the future POX infrastructure, makes the company strategically interesting. The investment case therefore extends well beyond today's gold production.
Solidcore combines an exceptionally large and long-lived reserve base with high net cash and a valuation that reflects only a limited portion of its long-term potential.
Kyzyl is the foundation. Ertis POX could materially increase the strategic value of the gold operations, while Syrymbet and the partnership with Bai Tau add further options in tin and copper. The key question is therefore not only how much gold Solidcore produces today, but how much value the company can create from its resource base, processing expertise and strong balance sheet over the coming decades.
A large reported reserve base and a strong balance sheet provide a solid starting position – even during a period of heavy investment.
A long-lived, high-grade gold deposit combined with in-house processing expertise for refractory concentrates.
Tin, copper and additional projects can create further value drivers that are only partly reflected in today's valuation.
Solidcore's long-term value comes from the combination of high-quality assets, financial strength and management's strategic foresight. What matters are the enterprise value, the investments still required, the free cash flows that can be generated over the long term – and management's ability to allocate capital where it can create additional long-term value.
Go to valuation ↓Central Asia · resource-rich country · geopolitical bridge
For many investors, Kazakhstan may look unremarkable at first glance – while carrying elevated political and regulatory risk. A closer look, however, reveals a mining jurisdiction with an exceptionally broad resource base and growing strategic importance. For Europe in particular, the country is becoming increasingly important as a partner for critical raw materials and the development of new supply chains.
Kazakhstan's economy has been closely tied to natural resources for decades. In addition to oil and uranium, the country hosts significant deposits of numerous metals. For Solidcore, the key point is that this geology supports not only existing mines but also new gold, copper and tin projects.
The EU and Kazakhstan are deepening their strategic partnership on sustainable and critical raw materials. In June 2026, both sides again reaffirmed their cooperation and implementation of the joint roadmap. In parallel, Kazakhstan is pursuing an investment strategy through 2040.
Kazakhstan is a presidential system with strong state influence. For investors, this means political continuity and a state that actively supports major industrial projects on the one hand, while tax, regulatory, governance and currency risks remain relevant on the other.
Kazakhstan in detail
Valuing a mining company requires more than looking at geology and mine plans. The political system, foreign relations, currency and investment climate all influence the risk premium investors should demand.
Kazakhstan is a strongly presidential, authoritarian state. Freedom House scores the country 23 out of 100 in 2026 and classifies it as “Not Free”. Elections are not considered free and fair; opposition, media and freedom of assembly are restricted. For investors, the rule of law, governance and potential political intervention therefore remain part of the risk profile.
Russia remains a central economic, geographic and historical partner. At the same time, Astana is systematically expanding its ties with China and the EU. The EU is already Kazakhstan's largest trade and investment partner; in June 2026, strategic cooperation on critical raw materials, energy and the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor was further deepened.
Kazakhstan accounts for roughly 39% of global uranium production and is the world's leading producer. The country also ranks 3rd globally in titanium, 7th in zinc, 8th in lead and 11th in gold. It also hosts significant deposits of copper, chromium, manganese, silver and other critical raw materials.
The economy is growing rapidly but remains highly dependent on natural resources. High inflation, an 18% policy rate and fluctuations in the tenge can affect mining-project costs, financing and valuation.
For Solidcore, abstract democracy rankings matter less than their concrete implications for property rights, mining licences, taxes, capital flows and project approvals. Tenge, transport and sanctions risks also arise from the region's close economic ties with Russia.
Kazakhstan is unlikely to join a Western bloc or abandon its relationship with Russia in the foreseeable future. Economically, however, the country is visibly broadening its options. European interest is growing particularly in critical raw materials and new trade routes – a trend that can increase the strategic value of Kazakh mining assets.
For mining companies, Kazakhstan is not only associated with additional risks. Part of the risk discount comes with economic advantages that can be material for a producer selling internationally. For Solidcore, the combination of revenues linked to the international US-dollar gold price and a partly local cost base is particularly important.
Gold is traded internationally in US dollars. A significant portion of Solidcore's operating costs, by contrast, is incurred in Kazakhstan – including wages, local services and parts of the supply chain. A depreciation of the tenge can therefore reduce the cost base when expressed in US dollars.
At the same time, local wage and service levels are materially below those in major Western mining regions. This is not a risk-free advantage, however: high inflation, rising wages and a stronger tenge can partly or fully offset the benefit. Solidcore itself has historically identified both the exchange rate and Kazakh inflation as key cost drivers.
Kazakhstan has a mining and metallurgical industry built up over decades. For a producer such as Solidcore, this means skilled workers, existing power and transport networks, suppliers and industrial expertise are already in place – they do not have to be built from scratch as they would in a new frontier market.
The same caveat applies: the infrastructure exists, but it is not perfect. Solidcore has, for example, already experienced constraints in rail capacity and eastern transport corridors as operational risks. The power market also requires rising investment and tariffs are increasing. The advantage therefore lies less in “cheap energy” than in an existing industrial base that makes projects such as Ertis POX feasible at this scale.
The risk discount does not apply only to stock-market valuations. It can also affect the prices at which deposits, stakes and development projects can be acquired. High-quality projects in Canada or Australia compete for substantially more Western capital.
For an operator with local experience, financing capacity and technical expertise, that can be precisely the opportunity: assume risks that other investors avoid – and in return gain access to geologically attractive assets at valuations that are harder to obtain in established jurisdictions. We will assess this point separately for Syrymbet and Besshoky.
We consider a blanket country discount of, for example, 20% or 30% from enterprise value too simplistic. Political, regulatory and institutional risks primarily affect the certainty and timing of future cash flows. In our valuation model, we therefore reflect this risk mainly through a higher discount rate.
As a working assumption, a real discount rate of around 5–6% appears reasonable for an established Canadian asset. For Kazakhstan, we use 7–8% in the base case and test 9–10% in a conservative scenario. This is not a universal market rule, but a transparent model assumption that we adjust for each asset according to mine life, development stage and project risk.
Just a few percentage points can materially change the present value of distant cash flows. For a long-lived resource base such as Kyzyl, the discount rate therefore becomes a central valuation variable.
For established assets in Tier-1 jurisdictions, we typically use around 6% in the base case. For producing assets in Kazakhstan we use 8%, roughly 200 basis points higher, reflecting political, regulatory and institutional risk as well as lower capital-market integration. As an external cross-check, Damodaran's January 2026 data assigns Kazakhstan an investment-grade Baa1 rating and a country risk premium of roughly 2.1%. The 8% rate is nevertheless not mechanically derived from that figure; it is a transparent Minenwerte model assumption.
The higher risk discount relative to established Western mining jurisdictions is real. What is an exclusion criterion for some investors can also create an opportunity for long-term investors – provided the valuation adequately compensates for those risks. In particular, the country's large resource base, established mining tradition, industrial infrastructure and growing strategic importance can create opportunities that are often valued much more highly in established jurisdictions.
Abai Region · gold
Kyzyl is Solidcore's core asset – and the main reason why the company's value extends far beyond its current annual production. As of 1 January 2026, ore reserves stood at 9.7 million ounces of gold equivalent with an average gold grade of 5.0 g/t. In addition, there were 2.5 million ounces of mineral resources grading as high as 5.1 g/t. This gives Kyzyl an exceptionally large reserve and resource base with very high grades for a deposit of this scale.
Infrastructure, processing facilities and know-how can be utilised for decades. That can turn a mine such as Kyzyl into a cash cow. This is why Kyzyl should not be assessed solely on current annual production, but on the discounted cash flow from economically mineable long-term reserves – taking gold price, costs, taxes, investment and operating risks into account.
Kostanay Region · gold & copper
Varvara is more than a single mine. Solidcore has built a regional production hub around the existing processing infrastructure, capable of treating its own ore from several deposits as well as third-party material.
The original Varvara asset was acquired in 2009. Good transport links, comparatively low-cost energy and an existing processing plant subsequently provided the foundation for developing the hub. Today, the reserve base includes Varvara as well as Komar, Elevatornoye and Baksy, among others.
Reserve base · 1 January 2026
Of the total 2.24 million ounces of gold-equivalent reserves, approximately 950 koz are at Komar, 675 koz at Varvara, 572 koz at Elevatornoye and 44 koz at Baksy. The hub therefore combines several deposits around existing processing infrastructure.
Metallurgy & processing
Unlike Kyzyl, the metallurgy is relatively conventional. Gold is largely free or associated with pyrite and other sulphides. Copper grade is the key differentiator: gold-bearing material with less than 0.2% copper is processed through a conventional cyanide-leach circuit, while higher-copper material is sent to flotation.
The leach circuit comprises grinding, carbon-in-pulp leaching, carbon desorption and regeneration, electrowinning and smelting. The end product is doré. Flotation, by contrast, produces a gold-copper concentrate, which is sold externally for further processing.
The hub effect
A processing plant does not have to be built for every deposit. Solidcore, for example, transports ore from Komar to the Varvara plant and also purchases gold-bearing quartz-sulphide ores from third parties for treatment in the leach circuit. The flotation circuit also processes third-party material; in 2025, the flowsheet was specifically adjusted to increase copper recovery from third-party feed.
That is precisely where the hub's strategic value lies: Existing processing capacity expands the economically accessible radius around Varvara. New or smaller deposits can therefore be developed with significantly less dedicated infrastructure.
Grades are substantially lower than at Kyzyl. In return, Solidcore has something different here: mines, transport routes and two distinct processing lines capable of accepting material from multiple sources. The asset's value therefore lies not only in its 2.24 million ounces of reserves, but also in its ability to integrate additional regional ore sources into existing infrastructure.
Pavlodar · pressure oxidation
With Ertis POX, Solidcore is bringing a central part of the value chain in-house. Processing of refractory gold concentrates is intended to cease relying on external plants and instead take place in Solidcore's own pressure-oxidation facility in Kazakhstan.
The plant is being built in the Pavlodar Special Economic Zone, around 500 kilometres from Kyzyl. It is designed to process up to 300,000 tonnes of gold-bearing concentrate per year and produce up to 500,000 ounces of gold in doré .
How POX works
The finely ground refractory concentrate is fed as a slurry with oxygen into a pressure vessel. At Ertis, the autoclave operates at approximately 240°C and 43.4 bar. Under these conditions, the sulphide mineral structures containing the microscopic gold are oxidised.
Only this pretreatment makes the gold accessible to the subsequent hydrometallurgical process steps. With double-refractory concentrates, however, oxidation of the sulphide matrix alone is not enough. Carbonaceous material must also be addressed in the downstream process because it can re-adsorb dissolved gold – the so-called preg-robbing effect.
The centrepiece
The central process vessel is around 50 metres long, approximately 6 metres in size and titanium-clad to withstand the aggressive high-pressure conditions. Solidcore describes it as the largest titanium-clad autoclave in the gold industry.
The vessel was manufactured by COEK Engineering in Belgium. After a journey of roughly 8,000 kilometres, it reached Pavlodar in 2025 and was installed at the Ertis construction site. The project is therefore already far more than a plan on paper.
Engineering & Execution Risk
Hatch supports engineering and procurement. Basic engineering was completed in Q1 2026; the project documentation was then submitted for state review.
More importantly, Solidcore is using an Ertis project team that has already delivered the company's previous POX project. According to the company, Ertis uses the same technology and the same flowsheet. This reduces technology risk – but does not eliminate the traditional risks of a roughly billion-dollar megaproject: construction, cost control, schedule and ramp-up remain critical.
Project progress
Economics & financing
Start-up CAPEX is stated at $978m . In July 2026, Solidcore secured financing of $600m: $300m from the EBRD and a further $300m from a banking consortium comprising ING, Société Générale and ADCB. The remaining capital requirement is expected to be funded through a combination of operating cash flow and financing.
The strategic value
With its own plant, Solidcore can eventually eliminate Kyzyl's dependence on external offtake and tolling solutions. At the same time, Ertis is explicitly designed for additional feed sources: alongside Kyzyl, Solidcore also cites Tokhtar and third-party material.
This could turn Pavlodar into a regional processing hub for refractory concentrates. Deposits whose gold is difficult to exploit economically without specialised pretreatment can have a very different strategic value for an operator with its own POX capacity.
The investment of around $978m is substantial. Its economic benefit initially lies in bringing back in-house a part of the value chain that has so far been outsourced: long-distance transport as well as costs and margins associated with external processing can be eliminated or materially reduced. At the same time, Solidcore gains control over a process step that is critical to Kyzyl.
Even on the basis of Kyzyl concentrate only Solidcore calculated an IRR of around 13% at a gold price of $2,300 per ounce. Additional own concentrates and third-party feed could increase utilisation and create further economic leverage.
Kyzyl's difficult metallurgy has therefore ultimately created a strategic opportunity: A plant initially built to solve an in-house processing problem can give Solidcore long-term access to additional refractory gold deposits and develop into a regional processing platform.
Northern Kazakhstan · tin & copper
With Syrymbet, Solidcore is adding a metal outside its traditional gold business for the first time. The undeveloped tin-copper project in northern Kazakhstan is among the region's largest undeveloped tin deposits and could become a new production pillar for the company from 2029.
Solidcore holds 55 % of the project. The definitive feasibility study is due to be completed in 2026; the Board's investment decision is currently targeted for September 2026 planned.
Resource base
The historical 2018 JORC Mineral Resource comprises, on a 100% project basis, approximately 492,400 tonnes of tin at an average grade of 0.40% Sn and approximately 91,400 tonnes of copper at 0.07% Cu. When entering the project, Solidcore valued this resource at around 5.9 million ounces of gold equivalent.
Important for valuation: these are Mineral Resources, not proven Ore Reserves. Only the ongoing feasibility study will show what portion can actually be converted into reserves under the planned technical and economic assumptions.
100% project vs. Solidcore share
* Gold equivalent is a common value metric for different metals based on defined metal prices – Syrymbet does not contain 5.9 million ounces of gold.
Why tin?
The most important use of tin today is not traditional tinplate cans, but solder. Roughly half of global tin consumption goes into solders that reliably connect electrical components.
Tin is therefore almost invisibly embedded in much of modern technology: circuit boards, semiconductors, data centres, vehicles, solar systems and communications equipment all require tin-bearing solder. The International Tin Association expects global tin consumption to rise from around 357,000 tonnes in 2023 to about 428,000 tonnes in 2030 .
From deposit to development project
The entry price
Based on the gold-equivalent resource quoted at acquisition, roughly 3.25 Moz GE is attributable to Solidcore's 55% share. The purchase price therefore equates to approximately $25 per attributable GE ounce in the ground.
This metric is explicitly not a DCF valuation. Resources must first be converted into reserves, financed, mined and processed. CAPEX, recovery, operating costs, metal prices, taxes and the time value of money determine how much economic value can actually be realised.
There is currently no public announcement to that effect. The ownership structure of 55% Solidcore and 45% Lancaster Group remains in place.
The question is nevertheless relevant from an investor perspective. Solidcore is driving the technical development and providing additional funding for the feasibility study, preparatory works and early procurement. If Syrymbet proves economically compelling and becomes a core group project, later consolidation of the remaining 45% stake could make strategic sense.
This consideration is explicitly Minenwerte speculation and is not part of the company's communicated plans.For the first time, the company could generate a meaningful share of production and cash flow from an industrial metal. That would reduce its direct dependence on the gold price while simultaneously increasing its operational concentration in Kazakhstan.
The $82.5m entry price for 55% appears low relative to the size of the historical resource. Whether it ultimately creates substantial shareholder value, however, will be determined not by how much tin is in the ground, but by the new feasibility study: CAPEX, recovery, production volume, operating costs and mine life will determine the resource's actual economic value.
NAV · scenarios · peer group
For a company with long-lived mines and major development projects, a simple earnings multiple is not enough. What matters is the present value of future cash flows. We therefore value Solidcore as the sum of its individual assets – separating operating substance, development options and the balance sheet.
Minenwerte approach
Gold price and discount rate have an enormous impact on the present value of a mine with a multi-decade life. We therefore do not use a single “fair value”, but a conservative range. The discount rate explicitly incorporates the country-risk discount for Kazakhstan discussed above.
Uniform framework used to derive NAV across minenwerte.de.
Reserve-backed production is valued at 100% of the asset DCF.
Concrete projects with a robust production plan receive 95–100% of DCF.
Project DCF with an explicit discount for permitting, construction, financing and execution risk.
Defined resources outside the robust production plan receive only a conservative optionality value.
Valued at zero in base NAV; potential value remains upside.
Infrastructure such as Ertis POX is not forced into the mine classification and is valued separately according to its own economics.
Sum of the Parts
An additional 0.946 Moz of M&I outside reserves is treated as D at 25% of reserve NAV/oz; 1.602 Moz inferred remains E = 0.
0.819 Moz additional M&I is valued at 20% of reserve NAV/oz; roughly 0.450 Moz inferred remains unvalued.
The last bankable FS provides the reserve and mine-plan anchor. The technical value is recalibrated to our metal-price scenarios and only 40% is recognised pending the new FS, investment decision, financing and construction.
Ertis is not a mine and is therefore valued separately from A–E based on the economic benefit of own POX capacity.
Without a completed publicly reproducible FS, no project DCF is used yet. Only the $15m actual investment is recognised.
The agreed acquisition has not closed and remains regulatorily blocked. No NAV is recognised until a closing is confirmed.
$648m net cash plus the last reported $128m net carrying value of the Bai Tau loan.FY2025, Note 21: US$130m contractual amount − US$2m ECL = US$128m net carrying value.
Methodology · Kyzyl
The valuation should not only produce a result, but also be reproducible. We therefore disclose the key assumptions and calculation steps.
Kyzyl's reported reserves are simplified into an even production profile through 2054. This results in approximately 346 koz per year – virtually in line with the 2025 mine-metal output of 347 koz.
We use Kyzyl's actually reported 2025 AISC unchanged as the long-term real cost base. The historical MET is not stripped out. The new progressive MET is added on top – deliberately conservative and easy to reproduce.
The Mineral Extraction Tax is recalculated separately. At $2,500 gold we apply 7.5%; at $4,000 and $5,500, 11 % the statutory maximum rate already applies.
Income tax is applied only after AISC and the additional MET have been deducted from the simplified operating margin. The 23% rate matches Solidcore's reported effective tax rate for 2025 and is above the statutory standard rate.
Gold price and costs are modelled in today's dollars; general inflation is therefore not added separately. During the transition to underground mining, mining costs per tonne will rise, but management says higher ore grades should more than offset this effect on a per-ounce basis.
Each future annual cash flow is discounted back to today using the relevant scenario discount rate. As a result, early cash flows carry far more weight than production in the 2040s and 2050s.
Methodology · Varvara
For Varvara, we use the reported $2,035/oz AISC 2025 as the real cost base. These already included elevated sustaining expenditure for tailings, rail connection and fleet renewal. We nevertheless do not normalise costs downward. The new MET is also applied in full on top. The 2.2 Moz of reserves are simplified across the remaining mine life through 2042. Additional hub value from third-party feed is not included.
Methodology · Syrymbet
The earlier bankable feasibility study provides the technical anchor: approximately 145 kt Sn reserves, a 14-year mine life and average production of roughly 6.5 kt of tin in concentrate per year. The former 50%-resource-proxy approach is removed. For current NAV, we recalibrate only the metal-price lever and then apply 55% ownership × 40% Category C factor.
Syrymbet · Category C
Until Solidcore publishes the new FS, the last bankable FS is used as the reserve and mine-plan anchor. The former 50%-resource proxy is removed.
These figures are a Minenwerte recalibration of the historical FS mine plan, not a new feasibility study. The historical CAPEX and OPEX assumptions have not been mechanically inflated to today's cost level; this may overstate the historical technical NPV. At the same time, Solidcore is redesigning the processing concept and capital requirement, so a simple inflation uplift would not provide a reliable current cost base either. Until the new FS is published, we address this uncertainty through the Category C treatment and recognise only 40% of Solidcore's attributable technical project value. The approach will be fully replaced once Solidcore publishes its new FS.
Methodology · Ertis POX
Solidcore's published feasibility study reports an IRR of 13% at only $2,300/oz gold – based solely on processing Kyzyl concentrate. Start-up CAPEX is $978m. Because no complete public project cash-flow model is available, we use this company figure as a simplified valuation anchor. We approximate an annual economic benefit of roughly $130m: $978m × 13% ≈ $127m → rounded to $130m per year. We discount this amount over 30 years using the relevant scenario discount rates; the Ertis CAPEX still outstanding today is deducted separately.
Not included in NAV
Ertis is designed for up to 300 kt of concentrate or around 500 koz of doré per year. Kyzyl is expected to occupy only about 55% of concentrate capacity. The remaining capacity can be filled with third-party material or future in-house projects. We deliberately assign this potential additional cash flow a value of zero .
Methodology note: the reported 13% IRR is a company figure from the Ertis feasibility study. Converting it into a constant 30-year economic benefit is a Minenwerte simplification and not the original Ertis cash-flow plan. The annual Ertis benefit is deliberately held constant across all gold-price scenarios: Ertis primarily creates value by avoiding external processing, logistics and comparable cost items, which do not automatically rise in proportion to the gold price. Gold-price leverage is already captured separately in the Kyzyl mine DCF. Scaling Ertis proportionally with gold would therefore introduce an unsupported second price dependency without a detailed project model. The different Ertis values across our scenarios are discount-rate effects, not gold-price effects. Amounts already invested are not deducted again. Third-party feed is not valued because gross tolling fees without reliable information on processing OPEX and contract margins do not produce a credible FCF estimate.
Corporate costs: Solidcore's 2025 AISC reconciliation shows that corporate SGA is added at group level rather than being fully embedded in the mine-level AISC used in our Kyzyl and Varvara DCFs. A separate deduction therefore remains necessary. We now use the $59m AISC-reconciliation line rather than the former $47m Adjusted-EBITDA corporate line, resulting in PVs of approximately $549m / $652m / $716m at 10% / 8% / 7%.
Method note: the model is intended to show valuation ranges and sensitivities rather than false precision; it is refined as new company data become available.
* Market metrics are a snapshot based on the reference share price used on this page. Reserves: 11.9 Moz GE as of 1 January 2026. Valuation assumptions are Minenwerte scenarios and are neither company forecasts nor investment recommendations.
Note on MET and royalty treatment: The AISC used are based on published company disclosures and, depending on the producer, may already include royalties, extraction taxes or similar production-related charges. In the simplified peer model, these components are not fully stripped out for each company and then re-normalised to a $4,000 gold price. For Solidcore, we additionally apply the progressive Mineral Extraction Tax effective from 2026 on top of the historical cost base. Solidcore's DCF is therefore deliberately conservative and contains a safety buffer. For the peer comparison, the key point is that the methodology is applied in a consistently simplified way across the comparison group and that Solidcore is not advantaged by the MET treatment.
Safety · environment · society
Kazakhstan is a former Soviet republic. Some investors still associate that background with outdated industry, low environmental standards, poor workplace safety and an irresponsible approach to people and nature.
But how much of that is still true today – and how does Solidcore actually operate?
Rather than relying on ESG ratings or corporate promises, we examine areas where responsible conduct can be measured concretely: workplace safety, water and emissions, energy supply, environmental review of new projects, and the economic contribution to host regions.
No lost-time injuries and no fatalities among employees or contractors.
of water used was recirculated across operations.
Operating and capital expenditure on climate and environmental measures, up from about $13m in the previous year.
Investment in communities and social infrastructure in host regions.
Safety
In 2025, the Lost-Time Injury Frequency Rate was again 0; there were also no fatalities among employees or contractors. For a mining company, this is a direct indicator of operational discipline and safety culture.
Water & resources
91% of water was recirculated across operations in 2025. Drier conditions nevertheless caused freshwater intensity for ore processing to rise. The longer-term direction remains focused on reducing freshwater dependence.
Energy & emissions
A 23 MW solar plant was commissioned at Varvara in December 2025. Solidcore invested around $24m in climate and environmental initiatives and continues to target a 45% reduction in Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030 versus 2023. Absolute Scope 1+2 emissions nevertheless rose slightly to 461 kt CO₂e from 455 kt in 2024, while emissions intensity increased to 1,168 kg CO₂e/GE oz.
New projects · Ertis POX
For Ertis POX, Solidcore commissioned an independent Environmental and Social Impact Assessment by SLR Consulting; biodiversity work was supported by SGS. The ESIA follows EBRD requirements and the Equator Principles IV and was made available for public consultation.
Processing technology
Kyzyl has a flotation concentrator commissioned in 2018. Varvara is the older operation and uses flotation and cyanide leaching, both established gold-processing methods. Varvara was fully recertified under the International Cyanide Management Code in March 2026, and tailings infrastructure was expanded in 2025.
Ertis POX is an explicitly new high-tech facility: Kazakhstan's first large-scale full-cycle pressure-oxidation plant for refractory gold concentrates. Its $600m project financing is provided half by the EBRD and half by ING, Société Générale and ADCB. Gold processing is not environmentally neutral, but we see no structural technology gap versus international producers.
Social contribution
Solidcore employed an average of 3,884 people in 2025 according to the Annual Report, invested $9.1m in local communities and reports around $335m in taxes paid (total tax payments, including production-related charges such as MET). Around Varvara, roughly 950,000 trees across 190 hectares had been planted by early 2026; the “Irtysh Sturgeon” project released around 8,500 juvenile Siberian sturgeon. Solidcore also financed local education and social infrastructure around its operations.
In the 2025 S&P Global Corporate Sustainability Assessment, Solidcore scored 63 out of 100 and reached the 91st percentile among metals and mining companies. Such ratings do not replace our own assessment, but they provide an additional data point.
Mining remains a significant intervention in nature and landscapes. What matters is whether environmental, safety and social risks are managed well enough not to endanger people, permits, production and therefore long-term asset value.
The available indicators argue against the stereotype of a backward mining operation: safety performance is strong, water is recirculated at a high rate and new major projects are assessed against international environmental and social standards. At the same time, higher freshwater intensity and slightly higher 2025 emissions show that not every metric is already moving in the desired direction. We will continue to monitor that development.
We will continue to monitor precisely this development.
What can increase value. And what has to work.
After the valuation comes the key question: what developments can reduce today's discount to intrinsic value – and what risks could prevent the modelled cash flows from actually reaching shareholders? We therefore deliberately distinguish between
re-rating catalysts, genuine value creation and execution risks.
An additional international listing would not create new cash flow, but could improve the investor base, liquidity and access to capital markets. Solidcore continues to view such a step as a longer-term option – particularly after further progress at Ertis POX and the resolution of remaining legal legacy issues.
Ertis is not only a solution for Kyzyl. Spare capacity could eventually be used for Tokhtar, additional refractory deposits owned by Solidcore or third-party concentrates. The plant can therefore create additional value without that value having to come entirely from today's Kyzyl production.
Financing is largely secured, but project risk has not disappeared. For a megaproject of this scale, construction, cost control, schedule, commissioning and ramp-up remain the key execution risks. Illustrative valuation stress: a two-year delay plus 20% higher remaining investment costs would reduce Ertis net NAV in our simplified base-case model from roughly $731m to around $370m. That is close to half of Ertis' net contribution, but only around 3–4% of total base-case NAV.
The transition from open-pit to underground mining is necessary to access the exceptionally long reserve base. At the same time, it changes mine planning, cost structure and operational complexity.
Kyzyl is the dominant value driver in our model. In the base case, roughly 75% of equity NAV comes directly from Kyzyl; including the net Ertis contribution valued through Kyzyl processing savings, roughly 82% of NAV is economically tied to this asset. Technical problems, delays in the underground transition or weaker resource conversion would therefore have an outsized impact on group value.
2025 and again for periods in 2026 showed how strongly external processing and shipping routes can affect production, inventories and cash flow. Until Ertis is fully operational, this dependence remains a real operational risk.
The tin option can create substantial value, but it must first prove itself technically and economically. The investment decision announced for September 2026 is now a concrete near-term catalyst: it could materially validate the Category C value currently carried at a 60% haircut – or, if negative, require us to reassess the project value included in NAV.
Solidcore remains heavily concentrated operationally in Kazakhstan. Changes to mining law, permits, capital controls or the broader state framework can therefore have a greater impact than for geographically diversified producers.
The progressive Mineral Extraction Tax reduces the leverage to rising gold prices. At $4,000/oz and above, the MET rate is already at its 11% maximum – this effect is included in our base case and should not be applied again as a blanket additional valuation discount.
Part of the cost base is denominated in Kazakh tenge while gold is sold in US dollars. Exchange-rate movements can soften or amplify cost inflation; local inflation also remains an important driver of operating costs.
Our valuation deliberately uses multiple scenarios. Lower gold or tin prices reduce cash flows and project values; higher prices increase them – although for gold, part of the upside is dampened by the progressive MET.
Solidcore itself is currently not subject to Western sanctions. Q1 2025 nevertheless demonstrated that indirect sanctions effects are real: group gold-equivalent production fell by 42% year on year; the main cause was delayed Kyzyl concentrate deliveries to Amursk POX due to operational issues that Solidcore explicitly linked to the impact of international sanctions on Russia. Kyzyl's quarterly production fell from 76 koz to 31 koz, or 59%, according to Solidcore's published asset table. Until Ertis POX is commissioned, processing of Kyzyl's refractory concentrates therefore remains dependent on external processing chains. With its own POX capacity in Kazakhstan, this dependence should structurally decline – making Ertis not only a growth project but also a tool for reducing geopolitical and sanctions-related risk. Source: Solidcore Q1 2025 ↗
As with any capital-intensive mining company, future large projects or acquisitions could require additional equity. For the currently visible development pipeline, however, we see no acute financing pressure: a substantial part of Ertis financing is secured through the $600m financing package completed in July 2026 and Solidcore has a strong balance sheet and solid liquidity. A larger equity raise therefore appears more relevant if the company decides to accelerate additional growth. In that case, dilution would be more the consequence of an offensive growth decision than a funding gap in the existing business.
The exclusive listing on the Astana International Exchange limits not only international investor access but also trading liquidity. In January 2026, the USD-denominated CORE line traded roughly 1.36m shares worth $9.9m – only about $0.5m per trading day on a rough average. Larger buy or sell orders can therefore move the share price materially; in stressed markets, spreads may widen and exiting a larger position can become more difficult. Source: AIX · January 2026 trading update ↗
On the opportunity side, the key factors are successful completion and utilisation of Ertis POX, development of Syrymbet and other projects, as well as improved international tradability of the shares. These factors can reduce existing operational risks, unlock additional cash flows or improve access to international capital.
On the other side are clearly identifiable risks: construction and ramp-up of Ertis, the further development of Kyzyl, dependence on external processing until Ertis is commissioned, and political, regulatory and tax risks in Kazakhstan. In addition, every producer faces gold-price risk, cost inflation and currency risk.
For the investment thesis, it is therefore less important that every positive scenario materialises. What matters is whether Solidcore executes its major projects technically and financially as planned while keeping external risks manageable. Ertis is the central turning point: If the project succeeds, it reduces a major operational dependence while creating new strategic options. If it fails or is materially delayed, that would be one of the largest risks to our current thesis.
Conclusion
Solidcore Resources is now a Kazakhstan-focused gold producer with two operating mines – and, in our view, a valuation that prices in materially more risk than our analysis considers justified.
Kazakhstan is not a Western Tier-1 jurisdiction. Political, regulatory and capital-market risks therefore justify a valuation discount relative to producers in Canada, Australia or the United States. We do not ignore this difference in our valuation: Solidcore's future cash flows are discounted at 8%, more heavily than the predominantly Western peers valued at 6%.
The most important asset is Kyzyl. The mine exploits an exceptionally large and long-lived gold deposit whose double-refractory ore, however, requires specialised processing. This is precisely where Ertis POX comes in: with the new pressure-oxidation plant, Solidcore is creating its own processing solution for refractory concentrates, reducing dependence on external processing routes while opening the option to process additional in-house or third-party concentrates in the future. Varvara provides the second existing production base.
. In addition, a new tailings storage facility was built or expanded in 2025. Syrymbet adds another dimension. The large tin project could diversify Solidcore beyond gold over the long term and give the company exposure to a strategically important industrial metal. Additional projects and potentially spare Ertis capacity create further optionality that is not fully required for today's investment thesis.
Valuation remains decisive. Even after applying a higher discount rate for Kazakhstan, Solidcore's market value in our base case remains far below modelled intrinsic value. The peer comparison leads to the same broad conclusion: measured by P/NAV and enterprise value per reserve ounce, Solidcore trades at a materially lower valuation than the large gold producers examined.
The risks are real. Ertis must be completed within the planned cost and schedule framework and ramped up successfully. Kyzyl must manage the long-term transition to underground mining. Syrymbet still has to prove its technical and economic feasibility. Kazakhstan, tax, gold-price, currency and general execution risks also remain.
Our investment thesis therefore requires neither a perfect scenario nor a valuation comparable with a premium Western producer. Rather, it rests on the question of whether today's discount is larger than the discount justified by the actual risks. Our analysis suggests that it is.
Solidcore combines an exceptionally long-lived gold reserve base with a strategically important in-house processing solution, additional tin optionality and a low valuation relative to peers. Even after deliberately applying a risk premium for Kazakhstan, we therefore see substantial potential toward what we consider a fair valuation.
The final feasibility study and upcoming investment decision will show whether project economics, capital requirements and the development plan confirm the strategic importance of the tin project.
With project financing secured, execution becomes the key issue: can construction, costs and ramp-up of the in-house POX facility remain within the planned framework?
Until in-house processing is available, the key question is how reliably Solidcore can process and sell its refractory concentrates through external channels.
Practical note
Solidcore Resources is currently listed exclusively on the Astana International Exchange (AIX) in Kazakhstan. Investors therefore need a broker that provides access to the AIX. Many conventional European retail brokerage accounts do not offer this market.
Freedom24 is one example of a provider offering European clients access to equities traded on the Astana International Exchange and the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. Other AIX trading members are also available. Whether a provider opens accounts for retail investors resident in Germany and on what terms CORE can be traded should be checked directly with the respective provider.
Freedom24 ↗AIX Trading Members include Freedom Finance Global, Halyk Finance, BCC Invest and ForteFinance, among others. Membership of the exchange does not automatically mean that a broker opens accounts for retail investors resident in Germany or other European countries. Availability, fees and the ability to trade CORE should therefore be confirmed directly with the respective provider.
All AIX Trading Members ↗Minenwerte note: The naming of individual brokers is for information only and does not constitute a recommendation, referral or paid cooperation. Market access, fees and regulatory requirements may change.